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Note
Tortured Language: “Individuals,” Corporate
Liability, and the Torture Victim Protection Act
Brad Emmons
In late May of 1998, a group of approximately 120 Ilaje
youths boarded the Parabe oil platform, a site operated by
Chevron Nigeria Ltd., to protest the oil company‘s destruction
of their surrounding community.1 This ―Concerned Ilaje Citizens‖ group,2 like other Ilaje tribespeople living in the swampland region of Ondo State, Nigeria,3 had for years helplessly
witnessed the destruction of their fishing grounds and water
supplies due to Chevron‘s dredging activities and numerous oil
spills.4 On May 25, weeks after Chevron refused to meet with
members of their community, the exasperated Ilaje youths
went to the Parabe platform and refused to leave until Chevron
provided compensation for the environmental damage.5 Undaunted, Chevron reported the occupation to the federal and
state law enforcement agencies, and on May 28, the company
 J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to give special thanks to University of Minnesota Law School Professors Jennifer Green and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for their invaluable assistance
in understanding the various arguments and policy concerns associated with
the topic of corporate liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act. To the
extent that this Note accurately describes these arguments and concerns,
much of that credit goes to them; any mistakes are, of course, my own. Many
thanks also to Laura Arneson, Jennifer Gover Bannon, and the hard-working
editors and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review for their advice and
efforts. Copyright © 2011 by Brad Emmons.
1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA‘S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES 135 (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/
nigeria0199.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See EARTHRIGHTS INT‘L & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FIRST
THEY POISONED OUR LAND: WHEN WE PROTESTED, THEY SHOT US 2 (2006),
available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Chevron
-first-they-poisoned-our-land.pdf.
4. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.
5. See id. at 135–36.
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flew members of the nation‘s navy and Mobile Police to the
platform.6 Upon arriving, these security forces opened fire on
the protesters, killing two youths.7 Later, they allegedly tortured the group‘s captured leader.8
Twelve years later, this bloody labor conflict in Nigeria had
transformed into a legal conflict in the United States. Because
a suit in Nigerian courts against Chevron and the government
actors was almost certain to fail,9 the surviving victims and
their families turned to U.S. courts for help.10 With the 1992
passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),11 the
United States had expressed its intent to provide an avenue for
the pursuit of civil damages for certain acts of torture or extrajudicial killing committed by ―[a]n individual . . . under actual
or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . .‖12 Yet since the Act‘s passage, district courts had disagreed vociferously over whether a corporation could be liable
as ―[a]n individual‖ under the TVPA.13 Although in 2005 the
Eleventh Circuit had held that a tort action could be brought
against corporations under the TVPA,14 the Ninth Circuit held
otherwise when it considered the Ilaje survivors‘ claims.15 On
September 10, 2010, the latter court found that Chevron could
not be held liable for the attack on the Ilaje youths in Ondo
State, concluding that corporations could not be considered ―individuals‖ for TVPA purposes.16 That ruling created a circuit
split on the issue—and threatened to derail future efforts to
hold corporations liable for torture or extrajudicial killings.17
6. See id. at 137.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991) (―Judicial protection against flagrant human rights violations is often least effective in those countries where
such abuses are most prevalent. A state that practices torture and summary
execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law.‖).
10. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff ’d,
621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010).
11. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
note (2006)).
12. Id. § 2(a).
13. See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text.
14. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1247,
1250–53 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding an action under the TVPA and the Alien
Tort Statute could be sustained against a corporation).
15. See Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1126–28.
16. Id.
17. Indeed, two appellate courts have recently adopted the Ninth Circuit‘s
rationale to reach the same conclusion. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., No. 10-1908,
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On one hand, might the Ninth Circuit‘s decision be technically correct? ―Individuals‖ are usually seen as distinct from
corporations in federal law18—and yet are not always so.19 The
legislative history directly preceding the TVPA hints that the
choice of language had nothing to do with the issue of corporate
liability20—and yet a committee hearing on the TVPA in an
earlier Congress clearly indicates the opposite.21 The traditional methods of statutory interpretation do not easily resolve the
TVPA‘s ambiguities.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit‘s holding raises
troubling concerns about the prospects of relief for victims of
corporate-sponsored torture. In the past decade, a large number of well-known corporations have come under legal scrutiny
for engaging in human rights abuses in dozens of countries in
Asia, Africa, and South America.22 Yet recent appellate opinions have prohibited tort claims for torture under any statute
other than the TVPA23 and have protected corporations from
civil actions under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),24 the TVPA‘s
statutory cousin,25 for such ―violation[s] of the law of nations.‖26
2011 WL 4349356, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (dismissing a claim against a
chemical manufacturer under the TVPA on grounds that the manufacturer
was no subject to suit under the TVPA); Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604,
607–09 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the TVPA does not create a cause of action against an organization), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17,
2011) (No. 11-88).
18. See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added) (defining ―person‖ under most federal laws as including ―corporations . . . as well as
individuals‖).
19. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 (1998) (holding
that the term ―individual‖ can be synonymous with ―person‖ and can therefore
refer to corporate entities).
20. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991) (failing to address possible corporate liability under the TVPA).
21. See The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1417 Before
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 87–88 (1988) (statements of Rep.
Jim Leach, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Doug Bellis, Legis. Counsel).
22. See Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global
Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 153, 160 (2003).
23. See, e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884 –85 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding that the TVPA ―occup[ies] the field‖ with regard to civil claims seeking redress for torture).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
25. The TVPA is nestled in the historical notes of the Alien Tort Statute.
See id. § 1350 note.
26. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)
(finding that the ATS does not serve as a jurisdictional basis for suits against
corporations since ―the law of nations‖ has not historically embraced corporate
liability), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
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Now the Supreme Court is set to consider the question of organizational liability under the TVPA in Mohamad v. Rajoub,27
but a holding that preserves Congress‘s anti-torture intentions
is not guaranteed.
Consequently, despite the seriousness of the plague of corporate-sponsored torture under the color of State law, possible
avenues of relief for torture victims are being blocked in jurisdiction after jurisdiction. Because corporations will otherwise
have no economic disincentive to discourage torture and extrajudicial killings, the need to preserve an avenue that provides
for civil liability for these crimes is especially vital. This Note
argues that while the language of the TVPA is ambiguous and
open to opposing, yet equally valid, interpretations, strong policy interests weigh in favor of recognizing corporate liability for
violations of the Act‘s provisions. Part I of this Note discusses
the history of the TVPA and the ATS and corporate liability
under each. Part II examines the unclear nature of the TVPA‘s
statutory language and accompanying legislative history as
well as the policy implications weighing in favor of corporate
liability under the TVPA. Part III embraces these policy interests, calls for the Supreme Court to recognize organizational
liability under the Act, yet reserves the possibility that Congress may also step in to modify the statute‘s language if necessary. Specifically, this Note argues that although the TVPA
does not clearly support or foreclose liability for corporations
engaged in human rights abuses, the nation‘s policy interests
in eliminating torture and providing redress for its victims are
best supported by judicial recognition of such liability.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE TVPA AND ITS NEXUS WITH
THE ATS
Though this Note focuses on the TVPA, the history of that
Act and the question of corporate liability under it are intertwined with the history of the ATS.28 After briefly reviewing the
Contra Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding
that corporations can be liable for violations of international law under the
ATS).
27. See Mohamad v. Rajoub, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No.
11-88) (granting certiorari); 11-88 Mohamad v. Rajoub, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00088qp.pdf ( last visited Nov. 6, 2011)
( presenting the question on appeal as ―[w]hether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a), permits actions against defendants
which are not natural persons‖).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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history of human rights litigation under the ATS, this Section
will discuss the passage of the TVPA, the express language of
that Act, the emerging question of TVPA actions against corporate defendants, and the potential limitations placed on such
suits by recent developments in TVPA and ATS jurisprudence.
A. EARLY HISTORY OF THE ATS
The modern era of human rights litigation in U.S. courts
began with the rediscovery of the Alien Tort Statute, which has
a short but notable pedigree for a statute that dates to the
founding of the republic.29 First passed as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,30 the ATS states in full: ―The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖31 No legislative history exists to shed
any light on Congress‘s intentions for the statute.32
Virtually forgotten after its passage, the ATS was only invoked successfully twice in federal courts in the first 190 years
that followed.33 However, the statute received fresh attention
following the Second Circuit‘s 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.34 In that case, a Paraguayan woman residing in
Washington, D.C., brought a wrongful-death suit against
another Paraguayan citizen who, the woman alleged, tortured
her brother to death while working as a police official in Asun29. See generally, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT‘L L. 249 (2004) ( providing a brief
overview of the statute and its history); Jordan D. Shephard, Note, When Sosa
Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2318 (2011) (same).
30. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9( b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
32. See Luis Enrique Cuervo, The Alien Tort Statute, Corporate Accountability, and the New Lex Petrolea, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 163 (2006) (noting
that the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not recorded). One
suggestion is that the ATS was adopted on the premise that ―upholding the
law of nations was an obligation of nationhood.‖ See BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 4 (2d ed. 2008).
33. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863–65 (D. Md. 1961) (finding jurisdiction under the statute for a child custody suit between aliens); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 Fed. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (finding an alternative basis
for jurisdiction for a maritime property dispute brought by a French citizen).
Adra suggests that six earlier cases and an attorney general‘s opinion also discussed but dismissed the possibility of jurisdiction under the ATS. See 195 F.
Supp. at 863 & n.5 (citing Khedivial Line v. Seafarers‘ Int‘l Union, 278 F.2d
49, 52 (1960)).
34. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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cion, Paraguay.35 Noting the universal condemnation of torture
among the governments of the world,36 the circuit court held
that the ATS provided sufficient jurisdiction for the suit.37 Even
though the ATS had rarely been invoked to provide jurisdiction,
the court concluded, the Paraguayan decedent had clearly met
the statute‘s requirements.38
Although suits for human rights violations under the ATS
―significantly increased‖ following the Filartiga decision,39 not
every federal judge was in complete agreement with its holding.
Just four years later, the D.C. Circuit Court issued a per curiam opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, affirming a
lower court‘s dismissal of a wrongful-death suit brought by
Israeli citizens against various Palestinian groups and supporters following an armed attack on an Israeli bus.40 In a concurring opinion, Judge Robert Bork attacked the use of the ATS as
a basis for suits such as the one before his court, arguing that
separation-of-powers concerns weighed against finding a cause
of action where doing so could interfere with international affairs, a field typically left to the ―political branches.‖41 Although
the other concurring judges distanced themselves from this
reasoning,42 Judge Bork‘s opinion nonetheless presented the
first serious judicial challenge to the use of the ATS to pursue
redress against those responsible for torture and extrajudicial
killings.
Thus, after almost two centuries of dormancy, a paradigm
for using the ATS to redress human rights violations emerged
among the circuit courts in the 1980s. However, opinions such

35. Id. at 878.
36. Id. at 883 (―Turning to the act of torture, we have little difficulty discerning its universal renunciation in the modern usage and practice of nations.‖ (citation omitted)); see also id. at 890 (―[F ]or purposes of civil liability,
the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.‖).
37. Id. at 880–85.
38. Id. at 887.
39. See Paust, supra note 29, at 250–52. ―Approximately 150 lawsuits had
been filed under the statute as of late 2006 . . . .‖ STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
32, at 12.
40. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ( per curiam).
41. See id. at 804 –05 (Bork, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring) (supporting dismissal despite
agreeing that the ATS provides jurisdiction for cases adjudicating ―the rights
already recognized by international law‖); id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring)
(supporting dismissal solely on political question grounds).
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as Judge Bork‘s in Tel-Oren raised legitimate concerns that this
paradigm was not sustainable.
B. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS
While natural persons remained the focus of ATS case law
in the first seventeen years that followed Filartiga, such litigation soon shifted to focus primarily on corporate defendants.
Through the mid-1990s, most cases brought under the ATS resembled Filartiga and Tel-Oren in that the alleged wrongful actor was a natural person acting as an agent of a foreign state.43
This trend changed with the 1997 decision in Doe v. Unocal
Corp.,44 where the Central District of California determined
that multinational corporations working in tandem with foreign governments could be liable for tort action under the
ATS.45 This decision ―opened the floodgates in this arena, so
much so that in recent times, ATS jurisprudence has been dominated by cases alleging . . . abuses by multinational corporations operating in the developing world.‖46
However, the feasibility of ATS actions against corporations has been drawn into question by a series of appellate
court holdings in recent years. Like all ATS litigation after
2004, such suits were most prominently affected by the U.S.
Supreme Court‘s landmark holding in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain.47 In that decision, the Court concluded that litigants
could rely on a modern understanding of which claims violate
―the law of nations‖48 when bringing suits, but that such claims
must ―rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
43. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A
Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 6 (2004). For examples of such cases, see Kadic v. Karadžić,
70 F.3d 232, 238– 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing ATS jurisdiction in a tort action for genocide against the leader of a Bosnian-Serb region), and In re Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475–76 (9th
Cir. 1994) (recognizing ATS jurisdiction in a tort action for torture and extrajudicial killings against the estate of the former President of the Philippines).
44. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d
932 (9th Cir. 2002).
45. See Duruigbo, supra note 43, at 7 (citing Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 880).
46. Id.; see also id. at 7 n.33 (contending that ―[u]p to fifty lawsuits ha[d]
been brought against [corporations] under the ATS‖ by 2004) (citing LINDA A.
WILLETT ET AL., NAT‘L CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003)).
47. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
48. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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features of the 18th-century paradigms‖ already recognized as
such violations.49 These violations included ―violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.‖50 Although dicta, the Court conceded that Congress had recently provided ―a clear mandate‖ that torture and extrajudicial
killings be considered violations of the law of nations—in other
words, the kind of violations covered by the ATS.51 Left unaddressed, however, was whether such actions also constituted
such a violation when committed by corporate actors.
Although the question of corporate liability under the ATS
has since been addressed by several circuits, a consensus has
not yet emerged. On one hand, three circuits have issued opinions that either assume or expressly recognize corporate liability under the ATS.52 On the other hand, the Second Circuit
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. recently repudiated
such liability when expressly considering the question, finding
that customary international law does not yet recognize corporate liability for human rights abuses.53 Although critics of the
ATS immediately celebrated the Kiobel holding,54 the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in that case,55 and it
49. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
50. Id. at 724.
51. See id. at 728.
52. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that a corporate defendant could be sued under the ATS for tortious
medical experimentation on human subjects in Nigeria), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3541 (2010); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir.
2008) (recognizing corporate liability under the ATS as ―the law of this Circuit‖); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a mining company could be found vicariously liable for, among other
things, village destruction and rape in Papua New Guinea).
53. 621 F.3d 111, 131– 45 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237
(U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). Notably, ―the Second Circuit had routinely
considered ATS suits against corporations and other juridical entities‖ before
deciding against corporate liability in Kiobel. Petition for cert., Kiobel, No. 101491 (80 U.S.L.W. 3237) (U.S. June 6, 2011), 2011 WL 2326721, at *19.
54. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Further Thoughts on Today’s Second Circuit ATS Decision on Corporate Liability, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17,
2010, 11:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/09/17/further-thoughts-on-todays-second
-circuit-ats-decision-on-corporate-liability/ (regarding the Kiobel ruling as ―a
blockbuster opinion‖); Julian Ku, Goodbye to the Alien Tort Statute?: Second
Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability for Violations of Customary International
Law, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/
goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-corporate-liability-for-violations
-of-customary-international-law/ (agreeing with the perspective that ―there
appears to be no serious argument left that customary international law can
impose duties on private corporations‖).
55. Kiobel, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237.
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remains unclear whether the Second Circuit‘s reasoning will
prevail.
By the early 1990s, however, the ATS was not the only
avenue for a tort action against alleged torturers. In addition to
bringing suit under the ATS, noncitizen plaintiffs had started
pursuing claims under Congress‘s ―clear mandate‖ against torture—the TVPA.
C. THE BIRTH OF THE TVPA
The 1984 Tel-Oren decision happened to coincide with a
renewed focus on international human rights abuses, both in
the United States and in the world at large. That same year,
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was adopted by the United Nations.56 This instrument obligated states to implement
measures providing protections against torture for potential
extraditees or deportees,57 criminalizing torture and complicity
in torture,58 and providing a jurisdictional basis for civil actions
against torturers.59 Similarly, 1984 also heralded a series of
hearings on torture before several House and Senate committees, followed by the passage of a joint resolution calling for
―the enactment and vigorous implementation of laws to reinforce the United States policies with respect to torture.‖60
In this vein, several legislators decided to bypass Judge
Bork‘s concerns by showing express congressional approval of
the use of federal courts to litigate tort claims for torture and
similar human rights abuses.61 In May 1986, Representative
Gus Yatron introduced a bill which would have allowed suits
against ―[e]very person who, under actual or apparent authority of any foreign nation, subjects any person to torture or extra56. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. The U.S. Senate ratified the Convention in 1990. See
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
57. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 56, art. 3.
58. Id. art. 4.
59. See id. art. 14.
60. See 133 CONG. REC. 6670 (1987) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. See 134 CONG. REC. 28,613 (1988) (statement of Rep. Patrick Swindall) (expressing concern that ―several recent judicial decisions have questioned whether [the ATS] provided a sufficiently clear basis‖ for such suits);
132 CONG. REC. 12,949 (1986) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (citing TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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judicial killing . . . .‖62 A month later, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill featuring similar language in the Senate.63
Though no major action was taken on either bill, both sponsors
continued to press for the passage of such legislation in subsequent Congresses. Representative Constantine Yatron had
more success in the House; that chamber passed similar versions of the original legislation in each of the following three
Congresses,64 at least once in overwhelming numbers.65 However, despite having the support of several prominent legal and
human rights organizations,66 the legislation did not find sufficient support in the Senate during the 100th and 101st Congresses.67 Finally, with congressmen concerned about the maltreatment of American soldiers on the battlefield during the
1991 Gulf War,68 both chambers of the 102nd Congress ultimately passed this legislation as the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, codifying the language within the notes of the
Alien Tort Statute.69
D. THE LANGUAGE OF THE TVPA
Section 2(a) of the TVPA, as passed by Congress on March
12, 1992, defines the scope of liability covered by the Act:
Liability.—An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil ac62. H.R. 4756, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986).
63. S. 2528, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986).
64. See 138 CONG. REC. 4178 (1992) (noting passage of H.R. 2092, 102d
Cong. (1991)); 135 CONG. REC. 22,986 (1989) (noting passage of H.R. 1662,
101st Cong. (1989)); 134 CONG. REC. 28,860 (1988) (noting passage of H.R.
1417, 100th Cong. (1987)).
65. See 137 CONG. REC. 2671 (1991) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)
(noting passage of H.R. 1417 by a vote of 362 to 4).
66. See 134 CONG. REC. 28,613 (statement of Rep. Patrick Swindall) (highlighting the support of the American Bar Association, Amnesty International, and the Lawyers‘ Committee for Human Rights for the House
legislation).
67. 137 CONG. REC. 2671 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
68. See id. (―Our soldiers languishing in Saddam Hussein‘s prisons have
almost certainly been brutally tortured. This bill will give our P.O.W.‘s a cause
of action . . . .‖).
69. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
note (2006)). Though the inclusion of active legislation in a statute‘s note section may not be common, it is apparently not unheard of. See THE BLUEBOOK:
A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 3.4, at 71 (Columbia Law Review Ass‘n et
al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) ( providing citation guidelines for material in a statute‘s
note section).
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tion, be liable for damages to the individual‘s legal representative, or
to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death.70

The Act also defines ―torture‖ and ―extrajudicial killings‖71
and requires that claimants exhaust all available remedies in
the jurisdiction in which the actions occurred before pursuing
action under the TVPA in the United States.72
The legislative history accompanying the TVPA significantly illuminates the factors motivating the Act‘s passage. First,
the accompanying Senate Report notes that enactment of the
TVPA would ―carry out the intent of the Convention Against
Torture‖ by ―making sure that torturers and death squads will
no longer have a safe haven in the United States.‖73 Second, the
legislation was designed to address Judge Bork‘s insistence
that separation-of-powers concerns required an explicit congressional grant of a private right of action for lawsuits which
may affect foreign relations.74 Finally, Congress acted with the
intent to put the United States on par with other nations that
were already allowing for civil suits against torture occurring
outside of the nations‘ borders.75
The legislative history also discusses, although incompletely, the reasoning behind the choice of language regarding which
defendants can be sued. In the 100th Congress, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs amended the proposed TVPA by
changing the characterization of potential TVPA defendants
from ―person‖ to ―individual‖ precisely to prevent corporations
from becoming liable under the Act.76 Subsequent House bills
continued to use that latter term,77 though their reasons for
doing so are never explained in the accompanying legislative
history. However, the Senate legislation preserved the use of
the word ―person‖ to describe potential defendants until the
102nd Congress, when Senate Bill 313 was amended in No-

70. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a).
71. Id. note § 3.
72. Id. note § 2( b). The TVPA also provides a statute of limitations of ten
years, measured from the time when the cause of action arose. Id. note § 2(c).
73. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
74. See id. at 4 –5 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
799, 801–08 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)).
75. See id. at 5.
76. See Hearing on H.R. 1417, supra note 21.
77. See H.R. 2092, 102d Cong. § 2(a) (2d Sess. 1991) (―individual‖); H.R.
1662, 101st Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 1989) (same).
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vember 1991 to change this term to ―individual‖ as well.78 The
Senate Report accompanying that chamber‘s later amendments
notes that ―[t]he legislation uses the term ‗individual‘ to make
crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued
under this bill under any circumstances: only individuals may
be sued.‖79 As far as the Senate Report is concerned, the language was only altered to clarify that the TVPA does not override traditional protections such as foreign sovereign immunity,
diplomatic immunity, and head-of-state immunity.80
As explained in the legislative history accompanying the
TVPA, the Act was designed to provide a tort remedy for individuals subjected to torture or extrajudicial killings while preserving the immunities traditionally accorded to foreign sovereigns. Soon, however, other potential defendants were
seeking refuge in the language that ensured these protections.
E. THE TVPA AND THE QUESTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
Despite the legislative history discussing questions of sovereign immunity, district courts soon relied on the use of ―individual‖ instead of ―person‖ in the Act to address a different concern—the liability of corporations under the TVPA. For
example, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., the first TVPA
case to consider corporate liability, an Indonesian tribesman
brought suit under both the ATS and the TVPA against an
American-owned mining subsidiary operating in Indonesia, alleging human rights abuses that included torture and extrajudicial killings.81 In ruling that corporations could not be held
liable under the TVPA, the Eastern District Court of Louisiana
expressly refused to rely on anything but the plain language of
the statute, pursuant to Fifth Circuit precedent that mandates
reliance on plain language unless an absurd result would follow
from doing so.82 Thus, as ―the term ‗individual‘ does not typical78. Compare S. 313, 102d Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 1991), quoted in 137
CONG. REC. 2671 (1991) (using ―person‖ in the original language of the bill),
with id., quoted in S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 2 (using ―individual‖ in the
amended version).
79. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7.
80. See id. at 7–8. For more on these immunities and their relationship
with the TVPA and the ATS, see generally STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at
365–84.
81. 969 F. Supp. 362, 365–66 (E.D. La. 1997), aff ’d on other grounds, 197
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
82. See id. at 381–82 (citing In re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 529
(5th Cir. 1995)).
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ly include a corporation,‖ the court reasoned that it would make
no sense to read such a definition into the term.83 While the
court noted the existence of legislative history discussing the
choice of the term ―individual,‖ it ultimately held that a limited
reading of the term was not inconsistent with that history, as
neither the House nor the Senate had expressly considered the
issue of corporate liability under the Act.84 On that basis, the
court concluded that there was no reason to recognize corporate
liability under the TVPA.85
The next reported case that considered the question was
brought six years later in the Southern District of Florida. In
the context of the decades-long civil war in Colombia, union
members accused Coca-Cola of engaging a governmentsponsored paramilitary unit to kill union organizers in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.86 In contrast to the Eastern District of
Louisiana, this court ruled that corporations meet the definition of ―individual‖ for TVPA purposes. Here, the court relied in
part on language from Beanal regarding congressional intent,
recognizing that ―[c]ongress does not appear to have had the intent to exclude private corporations from liability under the
TVPA.‖87 Further, the court cited the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Clinton v. City of New York,88 a decision that
had not been released until after Beanal, which recognized that
―the term ‗individual‘ is synonymous with ‗person‘‖ in many
contexts. The district court reasoned that because ―a corporation is generally viewed the same as a person in other areas of
law, a reading of the term ―individual‖ to encompass corporate
liability under the TVPA would be consistent with legislative
intent.89
In the following years, district courts continued to disagree
over whether the TVPA subjected corporations to liability un83. See id. at 382.
84. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 6; H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4
(1991)).
85. See id.
86. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–50 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
87. See id. at 1358–59 (citing Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382) (alteration in
original).
88. See id. (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13
(1998)).
89. Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; see also Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2006) (defining the words ―person‖ and ―whoever‖ in any congressional act
to include ―corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies,
and joint stock companies‖ unless context would indicate another reading).
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der its terms, with the majority finding no such liability.90 Still,
no circuit court ruled on the issue until the 2005 decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc.91 In that case, the
Eleventh Circuit considered an action by Guatemalan labor activists against a corporate employer under both the ATS and
the TVPA for torture and other alleged human rights violations.92 In overturning the district court‘s decision to dismiss
the claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that some of the acts described could constitute torture for purposes of each provision.93
Notably, however, while concluding that the plaintiffs could
bring the claims under either statute,94 the court did not expressly consider whether an ―individual‖ under the TVPA could
include corporate defendants. The court realized this omission
three years later in Romero v. Drummond Co., when considering a tort action under the TVPA by a Colombian labor organization against an American corporation‘s Colombian subsidiary
for alleged human rights abuses.95 Still, in response to the defendant‘s argument that its corporate status allowed it to escape liability, the Eleventh Circuit remarked that it had implicitly recognized the liability of corporations in Aldana, and it
concluded that it was ―bound by that precedent.‖96
Thus, it appears that until 2010, the only circuit court to
have ruled on the question of corporate liability under the
TVPA did so accidentally.97 However, the Ninth Circuit‘s deci90. Compare Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026 (W.D.
Wash. 2005) (relying on the plain language of the TVPA to conclude that ―individual‖ does not encompass corporations), and Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2005) (same), rev’d in part, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175–
76 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (same), and Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (same), with Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1266–67 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (relying on Sinaltrainal and the
TVPA‘s legislative history to conclude that corporations could be liable under
the TVPA).
91. 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) ( per curiam).
92. Id. at 1245– 46.
93. See id. at 1250–53.
94. Id.
95. 552 F.3d 1303, 1308–09, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
96. See id.
97. Before the Ninth Circuit‘s Bowoto opinion, the Eleventh Circuit was
indeed the only circuit court to have considered the question of corporate liability under the TVPA. However, the record on this question is significantly
confused by a recent pre-Bowoto Note on this topic that claims otherwise. Emily Martin states that a ―circuit split‖ already existed between the Eleventh
Circuit, which had held that corporations could be liable under the TVPA, and
the Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, which she claims had held that corpora-
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sion in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.98 represented both the first express appellate court consideration of corporate liability under
the TVPA and a clear rejection of the Eleventh Circuit position.
In that opinion, where the court decided the appeal of the Ilaje
youths against Chevron,99 the Ninth Circuit rejected the
Southern District of Florida‘s equation of ―person‖ with ―individual‖ in Sinaltrainal, noting that Congress‘s official definition of ―person‖ refers to ―individual[s]‖ as distinct from ―corporations‖ and other entities.100 While acknowledging the
Supreme Court‘s precedent in Clinton, which held that ―individual‖ and ―person‖ are often used synonymously in legislation, the Ninth Circuit also observed that the holding in that
case relied on the context of the use of the term ―individual.‖101
In the TVPA, the court noted, the term ―individual‖ is also used
―to refer both to the torturer and the victim of torture,‖ and it
would be absurd to conclude that a corporate ―person‖ could be
a torture victim.102 Finally, the court noted that the first iterations of the TVPA subjected any ―person‖ to liability under the
tions were not subject to TVPA liability. See Emily M. Martin, Note, Torture,
Inc.: Corporate Liability Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 31 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 175, 186–90 (2010). However, in each of the anti-corporate-liability
cases cited, Martin conflates the district court opinions with each case‘s respective appellate court opinion. See id. at 189 (stating that ―[t]he Fifth Circuit
held‖ against corporate liability but citing to a district court ruling); id. (claiming that ―[t]he Ninth Circuit adopted the position of the Fifth Circuit‖ but citing to another district court ruling); id. at 190 (stating again that the Ninth
Circuit‘s position ―was upheld by the D.C. Circuit‖ but citing again to a district
court opinion). In fact, in each of the cases cited by Martin, the circuit courts
never ruled on the question of corporate liability under the TVPA, deciding
each case on other grounds or giving none at all. See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 564 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009), remanding on other
grounds 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Bao v. Li, 35 F. App‘x. 1, 1
(D.C. Cir. 2002) ( per curiam), aff ’g without comment 201 F. Supp. 2d 14
(D.D.C. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir.
1999) (―[ W ]e need not reach the question of whether a cause of action for individual human rights violations is actionable against a corporation under the
TVPA.‖), aff ’g on other grounds 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997). When an argument has never been ―squarely addressed‖ by an appellate court, that court
is not bound by the argument, even if its holdings may implicitly accept the
argument. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630–31 (1993). As the
Ninth Circuit correctly recognized, the Eleventh Circuit was ―the one Circuit
court to mention the issue‖ prior to the Bowoto decision. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010).
98. Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1116.
99. See id. at 1126–28.
100. See id. at 1126–27 (citing Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
101. Id. at 1127 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429
(1998)).
102. See id.
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Act, but that subsequent amendments changed this term to
―individual,‖ indicating clear congressional intent to exclude
corporations from liability under the Act.103 Thus, rejecting the
Eleventh Circuit ruling and embracing the majority position,
the Ninth Circuit held that corporations cannot be held liable
for torture or extrajudicial killings under the TVPA.104
The Ninth Circuit‘s logic, since adopted by two other circuits,105 appears to seriously undermine future human rights
suits against corporate defendants when combined with Kiobel
and other cases. Under Kiobel, such claims cannot be brought
against corporations under the ATS;106 under Bowoto, such
claims cannot be brought against corporations under the
TVPA.107 To add to the confusion, the appellate courts disagree
as to whether the existence of the TVPA rules out suits against
any actor for torture or extrajudicial killings,108 since that law‘s

103. See id. at 1127–28.
104. See id. at 1128.
105. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., No. 10-1908, 2011 WL 4349356, at *3–5 (4th
Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (relying on Bowoto‘s analysis to find that a corporation
cannot be held liable under the TVPA); Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604,
606–09 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (similarly relying on Bowoto to rule out liability for
organizations under the TVPA), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17,
2011) (No. 11-88).
106. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131– 45 (2d
Cir. 2010) (holding that the ATS does not allow for actions against corporations), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). Indeed, because several circuits have concluded that the TVPA does not have a
jurisdictional provision, the foreclosure of corporate liability under the ATS
may have implications for some actions against corporations under the TVPA.
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (―Though the Torture Victim Act creates a cause of action for official torture, this statute, unlike the Alien Tort Act, is not itself a jurisdictional statute. The Torture Victim
Act permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the
jurisdiction conferred by the Alien Tort Act and also under the general federal
question jurisdiction of section 1331 . . . .‖ (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006))).
Under this logic, if the Supreme Court rules that the ATS does not contemplate corporate liability, TVPA litigants may be limited to an action pursued
under § 1331‘s federal-question jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.‖).
107. See Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1126–28.
108. Compare Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259–63
(2d Cir. 2007) ( per curiam) (dismissing a torture claim on other grounds under
the TVPA while finding the claim actionable under the ATS), with Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884 –85 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the TVPA
―preempts‖ claims of relief for torture or extrajudicial killing that would otherwise be litigated under the ATS).
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focus might mean that the TVPA ―occup[ies] the field‖ on these
subjects.109
Thus the viability of torture or extrajudicial claims against
corporate actors is threatened on three fronts—suits against
corporate actors under the TVPA, suits against corporate actors
under the ATS, and any suit at all for these wrongful acts under the ATS. With the Supreme Court poised to consider the
question of such suits under either the ATS110 or the TVPA,111
victims of human rights abuses perpetrated at the behest of
corporate entities may soon find themselves unable to seek redress in U.S. courts.
II. THE TVPA IS AMBIGUOUS ON THE QUESTION OF
CORPORATE LIABILITY
By specifically establishing a basis for civil actions to recover for torture or extrajudicial killings, Congress intended for
the TVPA to strengthen the domestic prohibition against these
crimes in a manner that allows the nation to fulfill its international human rights obligations.112 This Part argues that while
policy considerations weigh in favor of recognizing corporate
liability under the TVPA, the Act‘s language and the relevant
legislative history are ambiguous on the issue and have thus
created confusion in the district and appellate courts.
A. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
1. Statutory Language
As noted in Beanal, the first case to consider the question
of corporate liability under the TVPA, courts should first turn
to the plain language of the statute being examined when seeking to interpret the provision‘s meaning.113 Under federal law,
―individual‖ is a term that may generally be understood as distinct from the term ―corporation.‖ The Dictionary Act, the first
109. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 884 –85.
110. Kiobel, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237.
111. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 1188). The viability of such suits against corporations under either the ATS or
the TVPA will be considered by the Court in tandem. Id.
112. See Cuervo, supra note 32, at 173.
113. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 381–82 (E.D. La.
1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240– 42
(1989)), aff ’d on other grounds, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
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statute in the United States Code, provides general definitions
for a number of terms used in federal law, applying such definitions to ―any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.‖114 In that statute, Congress has defined the term ―person‖ to ―include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.‖115 According to the Ninth Circuit in Bowoto, this
definition implies that ―corporations‖ and ―individuals‖ should
be understood ―as distinct terms,‖ leading that court to conclude that ―we must therefore presume those terms have different meanings.‖116 With this understanding, the baseline presumption is that the TVPA does not provide for corporate
liability, as the Act only allows for tort actions against ―individual[s].‖117
However, courts that have recognized corporate liability
under the TVPA have pointed out that this presumption is rebuttable. As the Ninth Circuit itself had previously acknowledged, the term ―individual‖ ―does not necessarily exclude corporations.‖118 In Clinton, the Supreme Court concluded that the
context of the word‘s usage can make ―individual‖ synonymous
with ―person‖—the broader term that generally includes corporations—where doing otherwise would lead to ―an absurd and
unjust result which Congress could not have intended.‖119 The
cornerstone, then, is congressional intent—if ―Congress undoubtedly intended the word ‗individual‘ to be construed as
synonymous with the word ‗person,‘‖ then the particular word
choice should make little difference.120
Based on its understanding of Clinton, the Southern District of Florida concluded in Sinaltrainal that for purposes of
the TVPA, the terms ―individual‖ and ―person‖ were synonymous.121 After all, in everyday parlance, ―corporations are generally treated as persons in other areas of law,‖ and Congress
could have expressly excluded corporations from TVPA liability

114. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010).
117. 28 U.S.C. 1350 note § 2(a) (2006).
118. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000).
119. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (quoting Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)).
120. Id. at 428.
121. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358–59 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
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if it had preferred to do so.122 Indeed, there are many examples
in federal law where Congress has used different terms to
make it clear that corporations were not contemplated by the
statute in question.123 That it chose not to use such terms in
the TVPA, the district court concluded, demonstrates that Congress intended that the Act could be applied against corporate
defendants.124
Still, the Sinaltrainal interpretation is vulnerable to criticism—while it rests its holding on congressional intent, it overlooks the fact that such intent is manifested in the Dictionary
Act as well as the TVPA. The former statute can be seen as
evidence that Congress intended for ―corporations‖ and ―individuals‖ to be seen as distinct creatures, since they are defined
as two separate concepts encompassed by the word ―person.‖125
If this is the case, the onus is not on Congress to establish that
corporations should be excluded from the term ―individual‖; rather, the onus is on outside parties to establish that the terms
should be synonymous.126 Although it might be considered ―unjust‖ to find that corporations are not liable under the TVPA,
such a reading is not necessarily ―absurd‖;127 Congress may
have had good reasons for excluding corporations from liability.128 Therefore, the presumption against equating the terms
―individual‖ and ―corporation‖ has not necessarily been disposed of.
On the other hand, is this presumption accurate? The Dictionary Act does not expressly state that the terms covered by
the word ―person‖ are all distinct entities. Indeed, several of the
entities cited in that definition are plainly understood to be interchangeable in everyday language. For example, a ―firm‖ can
also be a partnership or a company,129 while a ―partnership‖
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(5) (2006) (defining ―consumer‖ as ―a natural person‖ (emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) (defining ―murder‖
as ―unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought‖ (emphasis
added)).
124. See Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
125. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
126. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the ―presumption of the Dictionary Act‖ that the terms have different
meanings).
127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the TVPA‘s legislative history).
129. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER‘S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 472 (11th ed.
2003) (defining ―firm‖ as ―the name or title under which a company transacts
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can also include companies or associations.130 The definition of
the word ―person‖ in the Dictionary Act might reasonably be
understood as a ―liberal approach‖ that includes a nonexhaustive list of terms so as to include all relevant entities,131 rather
than as a means to distinguish certain types of entities from
each other, such as ―corporations‖ and ―individuals.‖ An understanding that the word ―individuals‖ may also refer to ―corporations,‖ therefore, is not necessarily precluded by the language
of the Dictionary Act.
In fact, even the common legal understanding of the term
―individual‖ includes both natural persons as well as nonnatural persons. The district court in Beanal132 relies on the sixth
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which specifies that ―individual‖ means ―a single person as distinguished from a group or
class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as
distinguished from a . . . corporation . . . .‖133 However, the
same definition goes on to note that the word ―may, in proper
cases, include artificial persons.‖134 Because policy concerns
here weigh in favor of understanding the word to include corporations,135 this language suffices to show that the broad definition of ―individual‖ is not contrary to a common legal understanding of the term. Additionally, it is worth noting that the
modern edition of Black’s Law Dictionary abandons both the
distinctions and the clarification present in the sixth edition,
instead limiting the definition to either ―[e]xisting as an indivisible entity‖ or ―a single person or thing, as opposed to a
group.‖136 Thus, a definition of ―individual‖ that includes corporations is consistent with the second definition (as a single entity) and is thereby acceptable when used to interpret statutes.

business‖ or ―a partnership . . . that is not recognized as a legal person distinct
from the members composing it‖).
130. See id. at 904 (defining ―partnership‖ as ―a legal relation existing between two or more persons contractually associated as joint principals in a
business‖).
131. Michael Gerardi, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a
RICO Test Suite, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2251–52, 2252 n.56 (2009)
(noting the ―open-ended‖ nature of the definition).
132. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La.
1997), aff ’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
133. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1996), cited in Jove Eng‘g, Inc.
v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996).
134. Id.
135. See infra Part II.B.
136. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 843 (9th ed. 2009).
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Still, whether or not a presumption exists against finding
the two terms to be synonymous, critics of finding corporations
liable under the TVPA argue that the way in which the term
―individual‖ is used in the Act precludes such a finding. As the
Ninth Circuit concluded in Bowoto,
The TVPA consistently uses ―individual‖ throughout the statute to refer both to the torturer and the victim of torture. Corporations, of
course, cannot be tortured. Plaintiffs ask us to give the same word different meanings in the same statute. They ask us to interpret ―individual‖ to mean a natural person when referring to the victim, but to
mean either a natural person or a corporation when referring to the
torturer. This interpretation of the statute runs counter to the ―normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.‖ 137

Although this logic is persuasive, it is not unassailable.
The presumption that identical words must have the same
strict meaning throughout a statute ―‗is not rigid,‘ and ‗the
meaning [of the same words] well may vary to meet the purposes of the law.‘‖138 After all, ―[m]ost words have different
shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when
used more than once in the same statute or even in the same
section.‖139 Indeed, as human rights legal scholars have pointed
out, ―The United States Code is replete with examples of the
use of different subsets of a term‘s full meaning in the same
statute.‖140 For example, one statute concerned with water pollution subjects ―[a]ny person who knowingly violates‖ several
related statutes to criminal liability if that person ―knows at
that time that he thereby places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury.‖141 Although the
second use of the word person is clearly only limited to natural
137. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996)) (internal citations omitted).
138. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213
(2001) (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932)).
139. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)
(quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. at 433)).
140. See Brief for University of Minnesota Law School International Human Rights Clinic and Legal Scholars Michael Avery et al., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, at 4, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135).
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2006) (subjecting ―[a]ny person who—knowing that a person is an
alien, brings or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person‖ through prohibited means to liability (emphasis added)).
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persons, since only natural persons can experience ―death or
serious bodily injury,‖ the first use of the term encompasses
corporations as well as natural persons.142 Therefore, the fact
that a term is used twice in an act does not mean that it must
have the same meaning throughout the act.
Ultimately, the ―plain language‖ of the TVPA remains
muddled. There may or may not be a presumption that ―individuals‖ and ―corporations‖ are two separate entities. If that
presumption exists, it may or may not have been overcome by
clear congressional intent; if the presumption does not exist,
the multiple uses of the word ―individual‖ may or may not preclude corporate liability. The persistence of these ambiguities
implies that reference to the statutory language alone is not
sufficient for divining congressional intent.
2. Legislative History
When the plain text of a statute is ―inescapably ambiguous,‖ legislative history may be consulted to ascertain congressional intent.143 The TVPA is accompanied by committee
reports from each congressional chamber, several floor speeches by the Act‘s sponsors, and even some reports from earlier
Congresses. Unfortunately, none of the legislative materials accompanying the adopted version of the TVPA actually discusses
the issue of corporate liability, and the one document that does
discuss it hails from four years (and two Congresses) earlier. In
short, the legislative history is as unclear on the issue of corporate liability under the TVPA as the statutory language itself.
Each chamber in the 102nd Congress gives the same reason for choosing the language found in the TVPA. As previously
noted, the Senate‘s accompanying report explains that the term
―individual‖ was used ―to make crystal clear that foreign states
or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances.‖144 The Congressional Record indicates that the
possibility of such interference in foreign affairs was of special
concern to the Senate, which had in previous years failed to
pass similar legislation that used the term ―person‖ instead of
―individual.‖145 Similarly, the House Report from that Congress
142. See § 1319(c)(3)(A) (subjecting ―[a] person which is an organization‖ to
criminal liability).
143. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
144. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
145. See 137 CONG. REC. 2671 (1991) (statement by Sen. Arlen Specter).
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states that ―[o]nly ‗individuals,‘ not foreign states, can be sued
under the bill,‖146 implying that the later body gave fresh consideration to the language in its legislation. It is entirely possible, therefore, that the 102nd House chose to use the word ―individual‖ for completely different reasons than did the 100th
House. Further, as the 102nd Senate‘s accompanying report
gives a completely different explanation for choosing the term,
there is no indication that the 100th House‘s reasoning played
any role in the 102nd Senate‘s choice of language. Although the
earlier committee‘s rationale may hint at the reason for choosing
―individual‖ over ―person‖ when describing liable parties, that
hint is by no means dispositive and may indeed be irrelevant.
Finally, as even the Beanal opinion notes, the legislative
history accompanying the 102nd Congress‘s legislation does not
expressly note an intention to exclude corporations from liability.147 In fact, the issue of corporate liability was never explicitly
addressed in any of the legislative history accompanying the
version of the TVPA that was eventually passed. Courts have
alternately considered this omission to be either of great importance or of no importance at all.148 Such a wide range of reactions indicates that the omission is as ambiguous as the statutory language itself.
In summary, the relevant legislative history does not
squarely address the question of corporate liability under the
TVPA. Earlier legislative materials hint that the TVPA‘s wording was chosen to exclude corporations from such liability, but
the relevance of those materials is unclear, and later materials
indicate that the language in question was adopted for altogether different reasons. Just as the statutory language alone
gives no real guidance on the issue of corporate liability, the
legislative history similarly does little to resolve the issue.
Without further clarification, the statute remains a tabula rasa, ready for any court to read its biases into the question.

146. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991).
147. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–50 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382
(E.D. La. 1997)).
148. Compare, e.g., id. at 1358–59 (determining that corporations can be
held liable under the TVPA on grounds that the legislative history does not
exempt private corporations, with Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382 (determining
that the TVPA‘s plain language precludes corporate liability), aff ’d on other
grounds, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
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B. PUBLIC POLICY INTERESTS
The ambiguous nature of the statutory language and legislative history is especially disappointing considering the public
policy concerns that weigh heavily in favor of holding corporations liable for human rights abuses under the TVPA. ―Several
dozen‖ actions involving allegations of human rights abuses by
corporations have been filed in recent years,149 suggesting that
corporate involvement with such abuses is not uncommon and
that Congress‘s intent to eliminate torture and extrajudicial
killings would be best preserved if the TVPA were understood
to encompass corporate liability. Evolving understandings of
liability under the ATS, and of corporate rights and responsibilities, provide additional support for preserving a remedy for
victims of corporate torturers under the TVPA. Finally, the
preservation of corporate liability under this Act would avoid the
unintentional elimination of liability for a host of other juridical
entities. This Section considers each of these concerns in turn.
1. Corporate Liability Under the TVPA Would Support
Congressional Intent
An interpretation that includes corporate liability under
the TVPA is consistent with congressional intent, which seeks
to provide tort remedies for those who suffer human rights
abuses. As the legislative history accompanying the TVPA explains, Congress had several interrelated goals when passing
the Act. First, the TVPA exists to provide ―enforcement measures‖ to address ―human rights violations‖ like torture and
extrajudicial killings.150 Second, the legislation was designed to
meet the nation‘s requirement under international law, including the Convention Against Torture ―to adopt measures to ensure that torturers are held legally accountable for their
acts.‖151 Third, the TVPA was designed ―to provide means of
civil redress to victims of torture‖ in case the victims‘ home nations did not feature a functioning or effective judiciary, as
―[t]he general collapse of democratic institutions [is] characteristic of countries scourged by massive violations of fundamental rights . . . .‖152 Fourth, the legislation was designed to ―extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been
149.
150.
151.
152.

See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 312.
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3.
See id.
See id.

2011]

TORTURED LANGUAGE

699

tortured abroad,‖ as the ATS ―provides a remedy to aliens only.‖153 Finally, the TVPA was ―intended to deny torturers a safe
haven‖ in the United States, as a suit can only be pursued if
the federal government has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.154
Treating corporate wrongdoers as liable under the TVPA
supports each of these goals. By allowing civil suits against any
entity, whether a natural or a nonnatural person, who engages
in torture or extrajudicial killing, the TVPA provides appropriate enforcement measures to meet the nation‘s international
law obligations to hold such actors accountable. Doing so also
promotes the rule of law by discouraging corporate entities
from taking advantage of a nation‘s failing legal infrastructure
by engaging in brutal human rights violations in the furtherance of business goals.155 Finally, a rule allowing corporate liability provides strong incentives for American corporations to
monitor their foreign subsidiaries in order to make sure that
these entities are not responsible for torture or extrajudicial
killings in other countries,156 as a failure to do so subjects the
corporations to personal jurisdiction under the TVPA.157 Far
from contravening Congress‘s express and implied intent, a
recognition of corporate liability for torture and other human
rights abuses under the TVPA would fully support the goals of
the 102nd Congress upon passage of that Act.
2. Corporate Liability Under the TVPA Would Allow That
Statute to Serve as an Alternative to the ATS
With the viability of ATS actions against corporations very
much in question, the TVPA remains necessary as an alternative means of redress for victims of human rights abuses. In
discussing the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS,
the legislative record demonstrates Congress‘s intention that
153. See id. at 4.
154. 138 CONG. REC. 4176 (1992) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
155. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C.
2005) (noting allegations that an oil company contracted with the Indonesian
military to suppress a rebellion that interfered with the defendant‘s pipeline),
rev’d in part, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
156. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 365–66
(E.D. La. 1997) (describing allegations that an American mining company‘s
subsidiary engaged in human rights violations in Indonesia), aff ’d on other
grounds, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
157. See Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1266
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (finding jurisdiction under the TVPA for a suit against an Alabama mining company for actions by the company‘s Colombian subsidiary).
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the TVPA serve to complement, not replace, the ATS as ―a clear
and specific remedy . . . for torture and extrajudicial killing.‖158
In recent years, however, appellate courts have begun to severely constrain the applicability of the ATS. Although tort actions against aliens for claims of torture or extrajudicial killing
once served as the most common basis for an ATS claim,159 a
circuit split now exists as to whether such actions can go forward in light of the passage of the TVPA.160 Additionally,
though actions against corporations for human rights violations
have dominated ATS litigation for well over a decade,161 the
Second Circuit‘s decision in Kiobel has created another circuit
split that threatens to close off that avenue for redress as well.162
Corporate liability under the TVPA provides an alternative
mechanism for redressing these wrongs when they are also
committed in violation of the ATS, a necessary safeguard in jurisdictions that bar actions for torture163 or torts against corporate defendants164 under the latter statute. If the Supreme
Court ultimately agrees with the Second Circuit‘s conclusion
that the law of nations does not provide for an action against
corporations, the availability of a remedy under the TVPA
would prove vital to protect citizens of the world against deadly, unscrupulous business practices. Similarly, if the Supreme
Court were to agree with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding that the
TVPA provides the only channel for litigation against those engaging in torture or extrajudicial killing, the effectiveness of
the latter Act would be severely diminished if an entire class of
potential defendants proved immune to the sole remaining civil
action that can be brought against them for human rights
abuses. Without the protection against corporate and state158. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991).
159. See Duruigbo, supra note 43. (―For some time, use of the ATS remained limited to cases involving agents of the state who abused the power of
government to oppress their people, often with impunity.‖).
160. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
2007).
161. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 312.
162. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir.
2010) (holding that the ATS does not allow for actions against corporations),
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491); Ku, supra
note 54 (celebrating the potential demise of corporate liability under the ATS).
163. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884 –86 (7th Cir. 2005).
164. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 148– 49. But see supra note 106 regarding the possibility that an absence of corporate liability under the ATS may preclude
some claims against corporations under the TVPA, regardless of a holding that
the term ―individuals‖ as used in the TVPA can include corporations.
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sponsored abuses currently recognized by some jurisdictions
under the TVPA, the arrival of either or both alternative outcome would spell the end of redress options against some of the
world‘s most notorious abusers.
3. Corporate Liability Under the TVPA Would Encourage
Corporate Responsibility in an Age of Corporate Rights
Corporate rights appear to have been expanding quickly in
the past few decades, and the TVPA provides one mechanism
for ensuring that corporate responsibilities remain equally in
focus. The concept of corporate personhood has been recognized
in federal courts since as early as 1886, when the Supreme
Court pronounced that such entities had the same Fourteenth
Amendment rights as natural persons.165 Within ten years of
that opinion, the Court had developed enough caselaw supporting the proposition that the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protected corporations
as well as natural persons that the matter was considered ―settled.‖166 In the past few decades, these protections have been
further recognized as imbuing corporations with virtually the
same speech rights as natural persons,167 culminating in the
recent Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision
extending political speech protections to corporate entities.168
With the trend line established, some observers are concerned
that these cases ―have created a political atmosphere in which
corporations can wield their financial power while the interests
of the people has [sic] been relegated to the sidelines.‖169
To preserve general principles of fairness as well as the interests of such natural persons, the constitutional rights of corporations should be complemented by an understanding that
165. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). At
least one authority has questioned the precedential grounds of this holding on
the basis that the statement regarding corporate personhood appears ―in the
portion of the case before the actual opinion begins.‖ See Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to
Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 554 –55 (2010).
166. Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896) (citing Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386,
391 (1892); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 29
(1889); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U.S. 181, 189 (1888); Santa Clara Cnty., 118 U.S. at 396).
167. See First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
168. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
169. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 165, at 584.
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such entities also share the same responsibilities as noncorporate persons. For purposes of the TVPA, this translates into
pairing the protections of the United States against foreign injury with the responsibility to avoid engaging in injurious behavior in a foreign jurisdiction. Confirmation that corporations
are assigned both the same protections and the same responsibilities as natural persons would be consistent with the growing number of authorities that recognize the equivalent personhood of both types of entity.170 Further, this recognition
could go far in dispelling some of the bitterness felt towards
corporate entities in the wake of Citizens United.171 From that
perspective, responsible corporate entities and subsidiaries
would have nothing to fear and everything to gain from such a
move, as it would highlight the entities‘ voluntary acceptance of
accountability in a world that continues to apply further rights
and protections to such actors.
4. Recognizing Liability for Nonnatural Persons Under the
TVPA Would Further Avoid Unintended Consequences
If the plain language of the TVPA forecloses action against
any entity but a natural person, might victims who have actually suffered at the hands of such natural persons nonetheless fail to recover damages? As a concurring judge in the
Second Circuit‘s Kiobel decision noted, estates and trusts are
just as much ―juridical entities‖ (as opposed to natural persons)
as corporations.172 On that basis, the judge warned, a holding
that the law of nations does not allow for suits against corporations under the ATS might have the unforeseen consequence of
prohibiting such suits against the estates of wrongdoers responsible for torture or extrajudicial killings.173 Had that principle existed in the mid-1990s, a notable ATS case involving a
successful $2 billion suit against the estate of the former Presi170. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (defining ―person‖ as used in
statutes to include both ―corporations‖ and ―individuals‖ by default, without
regard to whether the statute imposes protection or liability); Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 (1998) (holding that the term ―individual‖
can be synonymous with ―person‖ and can therefore refer to corporate entities).
171. See, e.g., Robert L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating
Lochner’s Error in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM.
L. & POL‘Y 311 (2010) (comparing Citizens United to the infamous substantive
due process case).
172. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 161 n.12 (2d
Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment), cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
173. See id.
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dent of the Philippines might never have survived pretrial motions, and the President‘s victims would have never recovered
damages for their suffering.174
Unlike the ATS, the TVPA relies on statutory language to
determine who qualifies as a claimant and a defendant. Still, a
strict reading of wording that purportedly distinguishes between ―individuals‖ and other juridical entities175 might lead to
a similar outcome for victims seeking redress under the TVPA
from the estates or trusts of their tormentors. Indeed, in granting certiorari in Mohamad, the Court indicated that it would
consider the question as to whether the TVPA ―permits actions
against defendants which are not natural persons,‖ a broader
question than one limited to the responsibility of corporate entities under the Act.176 The fact that a victim‘s torturer may be
able to escape liability through death does nothing to help the
victim recover and rebuild her life following human rights
abuses. Recognition of corporate liability under the TVPA, via
either judicial interpretation or statutory modification, may
prove integral in preserving this avenue of litigation for victims
of torture.
In summary, the plain language of the TVPA and its accompanying legislative history are unclear on the question of
corporate liability under the Act. However, the United States
has strong policy interests in holding corporations liable for torture or extrajudicial killings that they have committed under
the color of foreign law. With these interests in mind, the following Part discusses potential solutions that would resolve the
ambiguities of the TVPA while continuing to address the
scourge of corporate-sponsored torture.
III. PRESERVING CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE
TVPA: SOLUTIONS
Although the language of the TVPA is unclear, the Supreme Court should recognize the liability of nonnatural persons under the TVPA when it considers the question. While legislative modification of the Act‘s language might also be
appropriate, such efforts may not be necessary if the Supreme
Court reaches a decision that is both supported by recent Court
holdings and consistent with Congress‘s anti-torture intentions.
174. See id. (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776–77 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
175. See 1 U.S.C. § 1.
176. See 11-88 Mohamad v. Rajoub, supra note 27.
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Additionally, the potential changes to the TVPA‘s language
might be less likely to pass congressional muster in the modern
political climate. This Part therefore begins with an examination of how the Supreme Court can resolve these concerns, then
moves to a brief review of the problems associated with pursuing legislative remedies.
A. SUPREME COURT REVIEW
A Supreme Court decision holding that corporations and
other nonnatural persons are liable under the TVPA would be
consistent with reasonable interpretations of the Act‘s language
and would support Congress‘s efforts to eliminate torture and
extrajudicial killings. First, such a decision would appropriately signal that the text of the Act contemplates corporate liability, a development that would be welcome in light of the disparate rational interpretations of the TVPA‘s language.177 A
flexible understanding of the term ―individual‖ to encompass
both natural and nonnatural persons in this context, even
when used in two distinct segments of an act, would be consistent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.178 Thus, the
Supreme Court would be clarifying the appropriate boundaries
for the nonstandard use of ―individual‖ while signaling that
corporate liability remains feasible under the TVPA.
Second, a Court holding recognizing corporate liability under the TVPA would support Congress‘s original policy goals.179
Because so much alleged torture is purportedly committed by
corporate actors,180 a TVPA that unmistakably provides for tort
actions against such entities would reduce human rights
abuses by imposing liability against some of the most egregious
abusers, thereby meeting our nation‘s international obligations
to eliminate torture.181 Further, because such abuses would be
reduced, persons of any nationality would be better protected
177. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the inconsistent interpretations and applications of the TVPA.
178. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,
213 (2001) (noting that ―‗the meaning [of the same words] well may vary to
meet the purposes of the law‘‖ (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) (alteration in original)); Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 (1998) (holding that the term ―individual‖
can be synonymous with ―person‖ and can therefore refer to corporate entities).
179. See supra Part II.B.1.
180. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 312 (noting that ―several dozen‖ such cases have been filed since 2001).
181. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 56, at 85.
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against torture and extrajudicial killings; in particular, citizens
of failing states could continue to seek justice for such abuses in
U.S. courts where their existing judicial system may otherwise
falter.182 Finally, such a holding would signal to potential violators that the United States does not tolerate human rights
abuses within its borders.183 Corporations would recognize that
in order to do business in this country while escaping tort liability under this Act, torture and extrajudicial killings would
not be available to them as a means for resolving labor disputes. Even if the text and legislative history associated with
the TVPA are not models of clarity, the Court‘s recognition of
corporate liability would preserve congressional intent while
resolving any questions about the literal meaning of the text.184
Third, such a holding would clarify that the TVPA‘s language does not foreclose suits against other nonnatural persons, such as the estates of deceased natural persons who engage in torture or extrajudicial killings.185 A Court holding that
recognizes the inclusion of juridical entities in the TVPA‘s use
of the term ―individual‖ would have the added benefit of allowing tortured persons or their survivors to seek recompense from
the estates and/or trusts of persons responsible for such abuses.
Congress‘s stated intention to provide redress for victims of torture is not effectively met if these victims cannot be compensated for the wrongs suffered at a torturer‘s hands merely because that torturer has died.186 Although this rationale is only
tangentially related to the issue of corporate liability for torture
and extrajudicial killings, such recognition nonetheless advances Congress‘s goals with the TVPA.
Fourth, a favorable decision in Mohamad would eliminate
the need to otherwise pass legislation that could be politically
unpalatable. In the last decade, the United States government
has shown an increased willingness to tolerate actions that
would have previously been condemned as torture if committed
by other actors.187 From this perspective, congressional action
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2( b) (2006).
183. But cf. DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 500–12 (2007) (noting the growing acceptance of torture in American government and policy circles in the early 21st century).
184. See § 1350 note § 2.
185. See supra Part II.B.4.
186. See supra Part II.B.4.
187. See, e.g., REJALI, supra note 183; Glenn Greenwald, The Inhumane
Conditions of Bradley Manning’s Detention, SALON (Dec. 15, 2010, 1:15 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2010/12/15/manning_3/ (describing the alleged mi-
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to reduce the prevalence of such abuses would possibly not be a
priority, and indeed might be condemned for political purposes.188 Needless to say, the Supreme Court need not consider
such modern political concerns when seeking to uphold Congress‘s original intentions associated with the passage of the
TVPA.
In addition to the foregoing factors, a Supreme Court decision recognizing corporate liability under the TVPA would have
other benefits weighing in its favor. First, considering that
precedent demonstrates the Court‘s recognition that corporate
personhood entails both rights189 and responsibilities,190 it
would be appropriate for the Court to find that such liability
exists. As with any Court review, there is also the alluring
prospect of finality—unless Congress did decide to respond by
passing legislation to the contrary, the Court‘s holding would
be the last word on the interpretation of the Act‘s language. On
that note, finally, any adverse Court decision on corporate personality under the TVPA can potentially be addressed through
legislative means.191
This is not to say that the Court is guaranteed to recognize
corporate liability under the TVPA. Considering the ambiguity
of the Act‘s language, which opens it up to multiple valid interpretations,192 a court that is disinclined to extend liability to
corporations under the Act would have sufficient precedent to
justify this decision.193 On the other hand, three of the justices
currently sitting on the Court ruled with the majority in Clinstreatment of a U.S. Army Private accused of leaking classified documents to
WikiLeaks).
188. Cf. Tweet from Congressman Steve King, Wonder What President
Obama Thinks of Water Boarding Now?, TWITTER ( May 2, 2011, 8:06 AM),
https://twitter.com/#!/SteveKingIA/status/65039561755066369 (mocking President Obama‘s opposition to torture following the killing of Osama bin Laden).
189. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913
(2010) ( prohibiting suppression of ―political speech on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity‖).
190. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428– 429, 428 n.13
(1998) (holding that the term ―individual‖ can be synonymous with ―person‖
and can therefore refer to corporate entities).
191. See infra Part III.B.
192. See supra Part II.A.1.
193. See Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (citing ―the normal
rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning‖ (internal citation omitted)), quoted in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting that both the torturer and the victim of torture are referred to as ―individual[s]‖ in the TVPA).
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ton,194 which relied in part on the proposition that the terms
―individual‖ and ―person‖ are synonymous in certain appropriate contexts; only one currently sitting justice explicitly opposed this language.195 Similarly, four current justices joined
the majority in 2001 when the Court reaffirmed that ―the
meaning [of the same words] well may vary to meet the purposes of the law‖;196 only one current justice did not agree with
this proposition.197 The fact that a significant number of justices have shown flexibility when interpreting the use of similar
terms based on the purpose of the law bodes well for those who
believe the Act contemplates corporate liability.
Ultimately, although the unclear language of the statute
means that no outcome is guaranteed, the textual and policy
justifications for a finding of corporate liability under the TVPA
should suffice to convince the Court to adopt such a position.
However, in the event that the Court holds to the contrary,
other means for preserving corporate liability under the TVPA
are available.
B. LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE TVPA
Depending on the Supreme Court‘s holding in Mohamad
during the October 2011 Term, legislative modification of the
TVPA may be required to address the ambiguity of the statute‘s
text while ensuring a cause of action for victims of human
rights abuses at the hands of corporate actors. Although several possible changes to the TVPA‘s language could be pursued,
the easiest and least disruptive approach would be to alter the
portion allocating liability so that it covers ―any person‖ rather
than ―an individual.‖ Under this proposal, the modified version
of the TVPA would read as follows:
Liability.—Any person who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to tor194. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420– 49 (majority opinion joined by Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg).
195. See id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Although Justice Breyer joined part of Justice Scalia‘s opinion, he did
not join the part that criticizes this language in particular, and his dissent
rested on different grounds. See id. at 470–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,
213 (2001) (majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer, as well as four others) (citing Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)).
197. See id. at 220 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (refusing to
agree with the Court‘s decision to ―assign[ ] the identical language a different
meaning . . . .‖).
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ture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual‘s legal representative, or
to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death.198

Because the United States Code defines the term ―person‖
to include more than just natural persons in most cases,199 such
revision would embrace liability for both natural and nonnatural persons, including corporations.
This alteration would improve the statute in several ways.
Most of the major benefits of a favorable Supreme Court holding—clarification of the statute, preservation of congressional
intent, and recognition of liability for various juridical entities200—would similarly emerge if the TVPA‘s language were
modified in this manner. In particular, a legislative effort to replace ―individual‖ with ―person‖ when describing the liable actor would leave virtually no room for confusion regarding the
applicability of the TVPA to corporate wrongdoers.
Two alternative revisions could also have the same or similar impact on the question of corporate liability, though each
presents its own problems. First, Congress could change all instances of the word ―individual‖ to ―person,‖ perhaps with the
caveat that no foreign state or entity could be liable. Under this
option, both the victim and the potential defendant would fall
under the term ―person,‖ thus opening up the definition to any
of the entities described in the Dictionary Act definition of the
term.201 While this move would eliminate the unhelpful specificity of ―individual‖ as it is currently used in the statute, this
sort of alteration would leave the statute vulnerable to the attack that the use of identical words ―in different parts of the
same act [implies] the same meaning‖ in both cases.202 Because
―[c]orporations, of course, cannot be tortured,‖203 the broader
meaning of ―person‖ would likely be narrowed to refer to natural persons so that the term could plausibly mean the same
thing in both instances. Because this solution perpetuates the
198. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) (2006).
199. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
200. See supra Part III.A.
201. Cf. § 1350 note § 2(a) (showing that an ―individual‖ can both torture
someone and be subject to torture).
202. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996)).
203. Id. (quoting United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.
2000)).
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problem rather than resolving it, Congress would have little incentive to pursue it.
A second alternative would be to add the phrase ―or corporate entity‖ after the word ―individual‖ in the provision discussing potential defendants, leaving ―[a]ny individual or corporate
entity‖ liable under the Act. This option would make it clear
that corporations in particular could be liable for torture inflicted on individuals. Although this solution most clearly addresses the problem by expressly specifying the existence of
corporate liability, it also would stand only a minimal chance of
passing—Congress is unlikely to specifically target corporate
entities without having some strong political capital or motivation to allow such a move. Further, this alteration does nothing
to address the concerns of those who would seek redress from
other juridical entities, such as the estates of deceased torturers. These issues can best be avoided by adopting the more
modest approach of changing the word ―individual‖ to ―person‖
when describing the liable actor.
Of course, even if this suggested change to the TVPA‘s text
were pursued, passage of such a statutory revision is by no
means guaranteed. As noted earlier, the current Congress may
not see the elimination of torture and extrajudicial killings as a
priority.204 Although the TVPA reflects the will of Congress
that such human rights violations be eliminated, this does not
mean that the current Congress shares the 102nd Congress‘s
sense of urgency on the matter. Unless an unfavorable Supreme Court decision somehow compels Congress to take action, the motivation to act may not be present.
That said, legislative modification of the TVPA remains a
viable option if the Supreme Court does not recognize organizational liability in Mohamad. Such legislation, if necessary,
would meet all of Congress‘s stated policy goals and uphold the
nation‘s international treaty obligations while requiring little
more than the changing of a single word. Because such a simple
change could have such a significant impact, those who believe
that corporations should be held liable for human rights abuses
should be prepared to pursue the legislative-modification option in the event that the Supreme Court fails to recognize
nonnatural persons as liable under the TVPA.

204. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The intertwined history of the ATS and the TVPA demonstrates the congressional desire that some forum or fora exist
for the litigation of civil actions brought against any entity that
engages in torture or extrajudicial killings. However, the ambiguities in the existing text of the TVPA have allowed courts to
create a circuit split that threatens to eliminate any and all
avenues for recovering damages from corporate wrongdoers.
Because this foreclosure of remedies would be contrary to congressional purpose and public policy, the Supreme Court should
recognize that nonnatural persons are liable under the TVPA
when it considers the question in the October 2011 Term. Alternatively, proponents of corporate liability for human rights
abuses should pursue legislative action to clearly codify such
liability under the Act. Regardless, in an era where corporations are operating virtually unfettered, the focus on preventing such actors from engaging in the worst forms of human
rights abuses should be renewed. Only then can we truly say
that the United States is doing everything within its power to
live up to its international obligations, provide appropriate
forms of redress for the most horrendous abuses, and expand
the rule of law and respect for human rights across the globe.

